American politics enters the midterm election campaign with three combined elements that rarely coexist without friction: extreme emotional polarization, structural distrust in institutions, and a climate of constant street protests. Minnesota doesn't inaugurate this dynamic; it confirms it. And, above all, it shifts it from the rhetorical to the physical realm. Maintaining this tension without escalating into conflict until November 2026 is more complicated than it seems.
In a normal electoral context, an incident with casualties during a federal operation would be a serious but manageable scandal. In a hyper-polarized electoral context, it becomes immediate political ammunition. Each side incorporates it into its underlying narrative: for some, proof of the federal government's authoritarianism; for others, evidence of the loss of control and the collapse of order. The campaign no longer revolves around policies, but rather the legitimacy of the system.
This connects directly with the warning made by Peter Turchin in his latest book : when electoral processes cease to be perceived as neutral arbitration mechanisms and come to be experienced as existential battles, political violence ceases to be an accident and begins to be a latent strategy.
Actors do not need to explicitly promote violence; they simply need not to rule it out.
Turchin describes an increasingly polarized world, with geopolitical blocs vying for power and, above all, a shared internal dynamic: conflicts between elites and counter-elites, an excess of power aspirants, the decline of the middle class, and a progressive loss of institutional legitimacy. He doesn't speak of good guys and bad guys. He speaks of systems. And according to this American scientist who studies human behavior using data and historical events from over 10.000 years ago, the time has come for the US to enter into a civil conflict. Because wars, like pandemics or climate crises, also follow cycles.
This reading connects directly with what we observe in our own research and reflections: political systems with more candidates than positions, parties saturated with internal ambition, middle classes bearing ever-increasing tax and living expenses, young people without a clear vision for their future, and older generations becoming the safety net of a welfare system that no longer reaches everyone.
This breeding ground doesn't produce immediate explosions. It produces polarization. And polarization, when it becomes chronic, eventually leads to disaffection. And disaffection, when it spreads, can transform into conflict.
What matters is not only what happens on election day in the US, but also what happens before and after. The United States has already internalized the idea that the results can be challenged, that the courts are suspect, and that the political adversary does not govern “legitimately” if they win. In this context, episodes like Minnesota act as dress rehearsals: they test the capacity for mobilization, the response of the state, and the social threshold of tolerance for conflict.
The question, therefore, is not whether the elections will trigger a classic civil war. The question is whether the electoral cycle will solidify a model of permanent political conflict, with intermittent spikes in violence, politically contested territories, and a sustained erosion of federal authority. That is precisely the scenario Turchin described: not immediate collapse, but prolonged degradation and the eruption of social conflict.
That is exactly the scenario Turchin described: not immediate collapse, but prolonged degradation and the outbreak of social conflict.
The European parallel helps put this into perspective. Europe is also experiencing polarization, protests, and crises of legitimacy, but with key differences. In France, Germany, and Italy, mass mobilizations—yellow vests, farmers' protests, urban riots—are directed against power, not between opposing levels of power. The conflict is vertical. In the United States, increasingly, it is horizontal and territorial.
Furthermore, Europe maintains a minimal consensus on the value of the state and public administration as arbiters. Even in highly charged contexts, electoral processes are not generally perceived as inherently fraudulent. In the United States, this presumption has been shattered. The result is a far more volatile political landscape.
In short: Minnesota doesn't herald an imminent civil war, but it does signal something perhaps more unsettling for an advanced democracy. It signals a contested election, fought in the streets, in the courts, and in the public discourse. And it also signals that the United States is becoming less and less like a strained European democracy and more and more like a system trapped in a cycle of internal conflict.




